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The Ireland v United Kingdom case concerns the treatment of detainees by British security 
forces in Northern Ireland and the implementation of internment or detention without trial, 
introduced in Northern Ireland in 1971.1 By reading human rights ‘as a language’2 and ‘an 
endless semantic battlefield’,3 we explore how the Irish Government in the Ireland v United 
Kingdom case sought to use the European Convention of Human Rights strategically to secure 
its own political assessment towards internment and the controversial interrogation methods as 
a legal outcome before a regional human rights institution. In this sense, the Irish legal team 
re-described and reframed the Irish Government’s political position on the use of internment 
and of interrogation methods in the language of Convention and according to concepts 
developed within the European Commission of Human Rights jurisprudence. We focus on two 
strategic moves that the Irish legal team pursued at the admissibility and merits stages of the 
European Commission of Human Rights proceedings, namely, submitting a wider range of 
allegations, alongside article 3 allegations, as an administrative practice and advocating for the 
                                                          
* Respectively Dr Aisling O’Sullivan is a Lecturer in Law in Sussex Law School and a researcher in the Sussex 
Centre for Human Rights Research at the University of Sussex and Dr Roja Fazaeli is a Lecturer in Islamic 
Civilizations in the School of Languages, Literature and Culture at Trinity College Dublin and Chairperson of the 
Immigrant Council of Ireland. The authors’ paper forms part of their larger edited book project on Ireland’s role 
during the evolution of the field of human rights law, which will be published by Routledge. 
1 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25. The terms ‘Ireland’, ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘Northern Ireland’ 
are used in this paper as these terms have been used within the Ireland v United Kingdom case itself. However, 
we recognise ‘how terminology raises complex questions about objectivity’ with any writing on Northern Ireland. 
See B O’Leary and J McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (Athlone Press1993) 
5.  
2 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of Law: Twenty Years Later’, European Journal of International law 20(1) 
(2009), 7-19: 9. 
3 P. Slotte and M. Halme-Tuomisaari, Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Oxford, 2016), 22. 
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hearing of expert testimony on the use of the interrogation methods (the ‘five techniques’). We 
explore these strategic moves in order to illustrate the semantic battlefield in operation and the 
potential limits of the strategic use of human rights as a language.  
 
THE 1970s AND LAW AS A ‘SEMANTIC BATTLEFIELD’ 
 
The Ireland v United Kingdom case began when the Irish Government submitted an inter-state 
petition under article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the European 
Commission of Human Rights in December 1971. It concluded with the landmark judgment of 
the European Court of Human Rights in January 1978. The period, early to late 1970s, has an 
undoubted significance in the evolution of the human rights field because it involved what 
Moyn calls ‘the NGO mobilization’ in which the appeal to human rights ‘framed activism in 
the 70s and 80s’.4 He describes this 1970s human rights frame as ‘a highly coalitional language 
that motivated essentially democratic activism’.5 Although its significance is agreed, there are 
opposing approaches in human rights historiography that read the significance of the period in 
competing ways, which, in turn, reflects the debate over the “origins” or “breakthrough” of 
human rights.  
 
The universalist approach (or the ‘textbook narrative’) searches for an “origins” of 
contemporary human rights project in a ‘deeper history’,6 such as in social movements of the 
nineteenth century7 or in 1940s Universal Declaration of Human Rights era. Using this 
approach, the 1970s is read as yet another “progressive” period in an inevitable (“universal”) 
linear progressive history towards human rights as a global phenomenon. The revisionist 
                                                          
4 S. Moyn Human Rights in History: The Last Utopia (Boston 2010), 312. 
5 ibid. 
6 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights, 5-9. 
7 J. Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2012). 
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approach rejects a deeper history for the contemporary human rights field, considering earlier 
social movements as distinct from the contemporary project. Instead, revisionist writers search 
for the “breakthrough” moment of the contemporary project in the post-Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights era.8 Although Moyn identified the breakthrough in the NGO mobilisation 
of the 1970s,9 Jensen stressed racial discrimination and decolonisation of the 1960s10 and 
Hoffmann emphasised humanitarian intervention of the 1990s.11 Therefore, the significance of 
the 1970s in the evolution of the field remains a contested debate among revisionist scholars. 
 
As human rights scholars, we reflect this opposition between universalist and revisionist within 
the literature yet we are agreed that there is no single concept of human rights rather human 
rights are ‘open-ended and ambiguous’.12 Therefore, we pull on Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari’s 
work as they conceptualise human rights as ‘open-ended and ambiguous’ yet seemingly 
absolute and weighted. They see this conceptual vagueness or ‘open-endedness as key to the 
usefulness of human rights because it allows anyone to argue their preferences as belonging to 
the human rights category’.13 Therefore, they examine human rights as forming a language and 
this portrays ‘rights as forming an endless semantic battlefield upon which participants argue 
over the meaning of key concepts’.14  
 
This concept of law as language and a ‘site of politics’ draws on the literature of critical legal 
scholars that identify the indeterminacy of law and the structural biases of institutions.15 Law 
                                                          
8 S. Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and History’ Past and Present 232 (2016) 279-310: 280. 
9 Moyn Human Rights in History. 
10 S. Jensen The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization and the Reconstruction of 
Global Values (Cambridge 2016). 
11 Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and History’, 295 et seq. 
12 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights, 1. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid, 22.  
15 See D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge 1998), J. Desantels-Stein, ‘Back in Style’ Law and 
Critique 25 (2014), 141-162, D. Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden 1987), M. Koskenniemi, 
From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 2005), E. Jouannet, ‘A 
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as a semantic battlefield is a ‘site of politics’ in which participants to struggle for hegemony 
over their opponents.16 In this sense, all legal discourse ‘is a surface over which political 
opponents engage in hegemonic practices, [enlisting] its rules […] and institutions on their 
side, making sure they do not support the adversary’.17 As any legal vocabulary is political 
open-ended, it means that ‘what gets read into it (or out of it) is a matter of subtle interpretative 
strategy’.18 In this sense, ‘political struggle is waged on what legal words such as 
“aggression”….mean, whose policy will they include, whose will they oppose’,  
 
To think of this struggle as hegemonic is to understand that the objective of the 
contestants is to make their partial view of that meaning appear as the total view, their 
preference seem like the universal preference.19 
 
In the case of international law specialisms, such as the human rights law regime, an issue can 
be framed in terms of the particular specialism, decided within that particular specialism’s 
institutional setting and in turn, secure the success of certain legal arguments that follows the 
general bias of the deciding institution.20 For instance, in the Ireland v United Kingdom case, 
both Governments re-described their political positions regarding the British Government’s 
security policy in Northern Ireland using the rights language of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and sought to deploy the language and concepts of the Convention strategically 
within the Convention’s institutions. For the Irish Government, the aim was to secure as a legal 
outcome a reading of internment, introduced in August 1971, as an excessive security measure 
in circumstances of the emergency situation, and the treatment of detainees, including the use 
                                                          
Critical Introduction’, in M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart 2011) and Koskenniemi, 
‘Twenty Years Later’, 7-19. 
16 Jouannet, ‘A Critical Introduction’, 7. 
17 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 17 (2004), 197-218: 200. 
18 Koskenniemi, ‘Twenty Years Later’, 9. 
19 Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony’, 199. 
20 Koskenniemi, ‘Twenty Years Later’, 11. 
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of sensory deprivation techniques, as violations of article 3 of the Convention, prohibiting 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.   
 
Similarly, Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari’s approach to the dilemma of history-writing is useful 
for situating ‘events’ within the wider historiography of human rights as a global phenomenon. 
They advise academic researchers ‘to trace down meanings invested in [rights] claims as well 
as examining the processes accompanying their making as well as exploring why they were 
made in first place’.21 In Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari’s edited work, they read the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights era as an ‘important moment of beginning’ because it is ‘an 
imagined reference point of origin’ that is ‘in retrospect’ invoked in endless documents; it 
becomes an origin because it is imagined and invoked as such.22 In this sense, myth and reality 
become enmeshed that shows the difficulty of writing human rights history with any 
certainty.23 Applying their approach, we suggest that the 1970s period is an ‘imagined reference 
point of “breakthrough”’ of human rights with ‘lines of continuity’ to human rights activism 
of the 1990s.24 Therefore, although we do not focus on the debate over origins/breakthrough 
per se, we take as our point of departure that the emergence of the contemporary human rights 
project was dependent on historio-political dynamics, using human rights as a language 
strategically, within institutional contexts. 
 
THE IRELAND v UNITED KINGDOM CASE 
 
We noted above that the Ireland v United Kingdom case concerns the treatment of detainees 
by British security forces in Northern Ireland and the implementation of internment or 
                                                          
21 Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari, Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights, 22. 
22 ibid, 26. 
23 ibid,  
24 Moyn, ‘The End of Human Rights History’, 309. 
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detention without trial, introduced in Northern Ireland in 1971.25 It was conducted under the 
original text of the 1950 Convention that had established two enforcement institutions, the 
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.26 Within 
this original framework, the Commission was authorised to consider petitions alleging breaches 
of the Convention brought either by an individual or by a state party.27 On the latter, the 
Commission automatically had jurisdiction over inter-state petitions once the state party 
ratified the Convention.28 If an application was declared admissible, the Commission would 
examine the merits of petition confidentially and if necessary, conduct an investigation.29  
 
During the merits stage, the Commission had to place itself at the disposal of the parties for the 
purposes of ‘securing a friendly settlement…on the basis of respect for human rights’.30 If a 
settlement was reached, the Commission issued a report that stated the facts and the terms of 
the settlement that was then forwarded to the Committee of Ministers.31 If a settlement was not 
reached, the Commission was required to draw up its Report on the facts and render its opinion 
on whether breaches of the Convention had occurred.32 As the Commission’s procedures were 
confidential, its Report could not be published rather it was sent confidentially to all the state 
parties to the Convention via the Committee of Ministers. Thereafter, the case could be referred 
to the European Court of Human Rights by either the Commission itself or by one of the state 
                                                          
25 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25. The terms ‘Ireland’, ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘Northern 
Ireland’ are used in this paper as these terms have been used within the European Convention’s jurisprudence. 
However, we recognise ‘how terminology raises complex questions about objectivity’ with any writing on 
Northern Ireland. See B O’Leary and J McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland 
(Athlone Press1993) 5.  
26 Section II of the Convention (1950) (original text): URL: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Collection_Convention_1950_ENG.pdf.  
27 Article 24 and 25 of the Convention (1950). 
28 Articles 24. For individual petitions, state parties had to declare acceptance of the Commission’s jurisdiction 
(article 25). 
29 Article 28(a).  
30 Article 28(b). 
31 Article 30. See article 14 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (representatives on the Committee [of 
Ministers] shall be Ministers for Foreign Affairs). 
32 Article 31(1). 
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parties to the case within three months of the transmission of the Report to the Committee of 
Ministers, if the state parties to the case had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights.33 If the case was not referred to the Court within three 
months, the Committee of Ministers had to decide by two-thirds majority whether violations 
of the Convention had occurred and to make ‘such proposals as it thinks fit’.34 In this sense, 
the original text of the Convention contemplated a report issued by the Commission and if a 
Court referral, a judgment.35 
 
In its February 1976 Report, the European Commission of Human Rights found that the 
treatment of detainees had met the ‘minimum level of severity’ threshold to violate article 3 of 
the Convention.36 However, it also rejected Ireland’s other allegations that the United Kingdom 
had breached its obligations under articles 5 (right to liberty), 6 (right to fair hearing) and 14 
(prohibition against discrimination) in conjunction with article 15 in regards to its security 
measures during the conflict.37 After the Commission’s confidential report was received in 
Dublin, the Irish Attorney General Declan Costello submitted a memorandum to the Irish 
Cabinet. He explained how the Committee of Ministers ‘can be unduly influenced by political 
considerations’ whereas the Court is a judicial tribunal ‘composed of eminent jurists who are 
                                                          
33 Article 46 and 48. Both the Commission and the old Court were abolished in 1998 and a single institution was 
created, retaining the title of the European Court of Human Rights. The new Court had compulsory jurisdiction 
to hear both individual and inter-state petitions and the adjudicative role of the Committee of Ministers was 
abolished. Under article 39 of the current text, the new Court has the competence to place itself at the disposal of 
the parties with a view to friendly settle the case. See Protocol No 11 to the Convention (1998) ETS 155 and 
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 39 of the Convention. 
34 Article 31(1)(c) and 32(1) respectively.  
35 National Archives of Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter cited as NAI DFA) 2006/133/677. AG 
Costello’s memorandum for the Taoiseach entitled ‘Future Procedures’, dated 18th February 1976, para 2. See 
also D Bonner ‘Of Outrage and Misunderstanding: Ireland v United Kingdom – governmental perspectives on an 
inter-state application under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 34(1) Legal Studies 47-75. 
36 Ireland v The United Kingdom, Application No, 5310/71 Report of the Commission (25th January 1976), 402. 
37 ibid, 103, 220, 475 and 485. For a recent discussion of Operation Demetrius, see M J McCleary Operation 
Demetrius and its aftermath: A new history of the use of internment without trial in Northern Ireland 1971-1975 
(Manchester, 2015). 
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required to act judicially and independently of the Governments who appointed them’.38 He 
also noted the differences between the confidential nature of the Committee of Ministers’ route 
and the public character of the Court’s proceedings, including the publishing of the 
Commission’s Report as part of the latter. Although he noted how this may be less significant 
given the British Government’s statements of having ‘no objection’ to the Commission’s 
Report being published, ‘the possibility of a change in its attitude is not to be ruled out’.39 Other 
considerations included the delays with the Committee of Ministers’ decisions and the 
preference for the lengthy and comprehensive analysis of a Court judgment.40 Ultimately, the 
Irish Cabinet decided to refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights and Ireland was 
again successful on its article 3 allegations yet unsuccessful on its other allegations.41 
 
Of particular relevance is the difference between the Commission’s 1976 findings and the 
Court’s 1978 judgment with regard to the ‘five techniques’ and article 3.42 The five techniques 
had been applied during the ‘interrogation in depth’ of 14 men in August and October 1971 
under Operation Calabra. It involved a combination of sensory deprivation techniques applied 
over several days – hooding, a severe wall-standing position, sleep deprivation, continual white 
sound and a rationed bread/water diet.43 In its 1976 Report, the European Commission of 
Human Rights found that the five techniques amounted to a practice of torture violating article 
                                                          
38 NAI DFA 2006/133/677. Attorney General Declan Costello’s memorandum for the Taoiseach entitled ‘Future 
Procedures’, dated 18th February 1976, para 4. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25. See also NAI DFA 2006/131/1422. Letter of Referral to the 
European Court of Human Rights, March 1976. 
42 Ireland v The United Kingdom, Application No, 5310/71 Report of the Commission (25th January 1976), 402. 
43 Home Office, Report of the Enquiry into Allegations Against the Security Forces of Physical brutality in 
Northern Ireland arising out of events on 9th August 1971 (Compton Report, 1971), Chapter IV, para. 47. On 
British Ministry of Defence policy regarding the use of the ‘five techniques’, see also S Newbery ‘Intelligence 
and Controversial British Interrogation Techniques: The Northern Ireland Case 1971-1972’ (2009) 20 Irish 
Studies in International Affairs 103 and S Newbery Interrogation, Intelligence and Security: Controversial British 
Techniques (Manchester University Press Manchester 2015). 
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3 of the Convention.44 The Commission had found that the ‘five techniques’ as applied in 
combination had a systematic character similar to systems applied in previous times for 
inducing information or a confession.45 Nevertheless, although the Court acknowledged the 
systematic character of the ‘five techniques and their purpose in extracting information, it ruled 
that the practice did not have the ‘intensity’ of pain and suffering to amount to a practice of 
torture but rather was a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment.46 The Court ruled that 
the Convention attaches a special stigma to torture as ‘deliberate inhuman treatment causing 
very serious and cruel suffering’.47  
 
The controversy over the legal classification of the ‘five techniques’, whether constituting a 
practice of torture or inhuman treatment, continues to have contemporary significance because 
the Court’s approach has been invoked in other international contexts, even though the Court 
itself has evolved its approach in its more recent judgments.48 For instance, the US Office of 
Assistant Attorney General, in the infamous Torture Memo written for the then US Attorney 
General Gonzales, cited the Court’s ruling as allowing ‘an aggressive interpretation as to what 
amounts to torture’ with regard to US operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.49 
Against this contentious debate, the Irish Government in late 2014 requested the European 
Court of Human Rights to revise its ruling in the original 1978 judgment that the ‘five 
                                                          
44 Ireland v The United Kingdom, Application No, 5310/71 Report of the Commission (25th January 1976), 402. 
45 ibid. 
46 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25, para 167. See also Gäfgen v Germany, Appl. no. 22978/05 
(1 June 2010) para 90. 
47 ibid. 
48 Al-Nashiri v Poland, Appl. no. 28761/11 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014) para 516. Here, the Court ruled that the use by 
the CIA of various premediated techniques including hooding and stress positions (for instance, wall-standing) in 
detention sites in Poland constituted the practice of torture under article 3. See also Selmouni v France, Appl. no. 
25803/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1999) para 101 (reiterated that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ and ‘given the 
increasingly high standard being required in the area of protection of human rights, what may have been classified 
as inhuman treatment in the past, may be classified as torture in the future’. ibid. 
49 KJ Greenberg and JL Dratel (eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu-Gharib (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 199. Note also the Baha Mousa Inquiry that demonstrated how some of the five techniques were employed 
by British Armed forces in Iraq in 2003, URL: www.bahamousainquiry.org (Vol 2, Pts IV-IX).  
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techniques’ were a practice of inhuman treatment, but not torture, in violation of article 3 of 
the Convention.50 The Irish Government justified its request for revision on the discovery of 
‘new facts’ within archival documents located in the British National Archives by the Pat 
Finucane Centre, the Irish Centre for Human Rights, NUI Galway and RTE’s Investigation 
Unit.51 Under Rule 80(1) of the Rules of the Court, the Court can revise a judgment where there 
is ‘the discovery of a fact which might by its nature have a decisive influence and which, when 
a judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not reasonably have been 
known to that party…’.52  
 
In its 2018 judgement, the European Court of Human Rights briefly mapped out a selection of 
documents that the Irish Government had submitted in support of its claim that the British 
Government had withheld certain important information from Commission and Court, namely 
relevant internal medical reports and information indicating a policy of withholding key facts 
concerning the five techniques, including the Ministerial authorisation.53 Key medical evidence 
included Dr Leigh’s report on one of the men subjected to the five techniques (S.K). that was 
submitted to the Ministry of Defence in 1975 in consideration of the settlement of civil claims. 
Dr Leigh had earlier given evidence as the British Government’s expert witness before the 
European Commission of Human Rights and had argued that from his assessment of two 
illustrative cases (P.C. and P.S.), they suffered acute psychiatric symptoms at the time of being 
subjected to the five techniques.54 ‘Any after-effects were diminishing and not severe and were 
partly due to living conditions in Northern Ireland’.55 However, in his June 1975 Report, he 
                                                          
50 Anon. ‘Government asks European Court to revise ‘Hooded Men’ ruling’, Irish Times, 3rd December 2014. See 
also ‘Government may decide on ‘Hooded Men’ case, court told’, Irish Times, 1st December 2014. 
51 See RTE Investigation’s Unit, ‘The Torture Files’, June 4th 2014. 
52 Rule 80(1) of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights.  
53 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71, Judgment (Revision) 20th March 2018, 
54 ibid, para 11. 
55 ibid. 
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considered certain symptoms displayed by SK to be a result of the five techniques.56 Other 
documents indicated how the decision to use the interrogation methods had been a political 
decision taken by Ministers in both Stormont and Westminster, in particular the Secretary of 
State for Defence Lord Carrington.57  
 
In a 6/7 majority judgment, the Court rejected the Irish Government’s claim that these ‘new 
facts’ met the Rule 80 criteria. They stressed how ‘legal certainty’ must prevail in a situation 
where there was any doubt about whether the new facts did actually have a ‘decisive 
influence.58 Using this frame, they noted how the original 1978 judgment did not mention the 
issue of long-term effects. Rather it only referred to ‘acute psychiatric disturbances during 
interrogation’ and therefore, it concluded that this issue was not a decisive element in judicial 
decision-making.59 They also disagreed that the British Government’s general attitude towards 
co-operation and towards disclosure on the level of authorization had been unknown to the 
Court.60 It pointed to how, in the original 1978 judgment, the Court had expressed regret about 
the British Government’s attitude, noting the Commission’s criticism that the latter had not 
always provided the assistance desirable.61 It also argued that the British Government had 
‘conceded from the start’ that there had been authorization at ‘a high level’ and had been taught 
to members of the RUC at a seminar in April 1971.62 
 
                                                          
56 ibid, para 23. 
57 The National Archives, Ministry of Defence (hereinafter cited as TNA DEFE) 68/152. See also D Bonner ‘Of 
outrage and misunderstanding: Ireland v United Kingdom –governmental perspectives on an inter-state 
application under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 34(1) Legal Studies 47-75: 71 (note 
Bonner’s discussion of reaction to Rees’ memo).  
58 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71, Judgment (Revision) 20th March 2018, para 122. 
59 ibid,132. 
60 ibid, 116. On Dr Leigh’s 1975 report, the Court noted that it post-dated his witness hearings before the European 
Commission of Human Rights and that the report related to one of the 14 men who was not one of the two 
‘illustrative cases’ (P.C. and P.S.) that were heard by the Commission.  
61 ibid, 117. 
62 ibid. 
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In her dissenting judgement, Judge O’Leary stressed the obligation on state parties to cooperate 
with the Convention mechanisms as understood at the time of the original proceedings.63 Using 
this frame, she pointed to the significant weight attached to medical evidence by the 
Commission in its fact-finding64 and in turn, how the Court relied on the Commission’s factual 
analysis.65 She noted how the dissenting judges in the original proceedings had stressed the 
‘systematic nature of the treatment, as well as the centrality to the judicial discussion of the 
treatment’s purpose and effects’.66 Therefore, in her view, the medical evidence played ‘am 
important, indeed central role’ in the original proceedings and would have been central (or a 
‘decisive influence’) for the Court’s 1978 ruling.67 She also disagreed that the new facts were 
‘not unknown’ to the Court as ‘it is difficult to understand how this Court knew as established 
facts in 1978 what other suspected but were previously unable to prove until the archive had 
been declassified, found and compiled’.68 This judgment is since under appeal to the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which means the legal issues remain 
contentious.69  
 
STRATEGIC USE IN LITIGATING ON ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 
 
When internment was introduced on August 9th 1971, a complex set of dynamics was set in 
motion that led to the Ireland v United Kingdom case being submitted in December 1971. It 
dramatically changed internal conservations within Foreign Affairs, Taoiseach and Attorney 
                                                          
63 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71, Dissenting Judgement 20th March 2018, para 27. For 
detailed discussion of archival documents on level of authorization, see Judge Maguire’s judgment in McGuigan 
and McKenna case (2017) NIQB 96, 142-154. 
64 ibid, 62. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid, para 69. 
69 A O’Faolain ‘State to Appeal European court ruling on hooded men ‘torture’, Irish Times, 12th June 2018.  
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General’s Office about internationalising the Northern Ireland conflict through human rights 
multilateral institutions. As Brice Dickson illustrates, earlier attempts by nationalist NGOs 
from the late 1960s to pressure the Irish Government to take an inter-state case repeatedly 
failed.70 Mahon Hayes, former Legal Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs recalled 
how both he and Declan Quigley, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Attorney General’s Office, 
were frequently discussing whether the evolving conflict could be framed within the European 
Convention of Human Rights. However, they concluded the rule on exhaustion of domestic 
remedies was a huge obstacle which they were unlikely to overcome and therefore was neither 
legally or politically viable if their case would be only thrown out at the Admissibility stage.71 
Under international law, the exhaustion of domestic rule developed within the regime of 
diplomatic protection, a political mechanism for invoking state responsibility. This rule 
requires that individual victims first exhaust all domestic legal remedies available, that is, to 
‘make “normal use” of remedies “likely to be effective and adequate”’.72 The underlying 
principle is that the state is afford ‘an opportunity…to redress any violation [of its international 
obligations] within the domestic arena’.73 With the ‘move to institutions’ in the post-war era, 
this rule was incorporated as an admissibility criteria within statutes of international human 
rights institutions.74  
 
                                                          
70 B Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2010) 46 et seq (detailing the attempts by the applicants’ lawyer James Heaney to gain 
the support for the applications from the Irish Minister for External Affairs). See also NAI DFA 2001/43/1304. 
71 Interview with Mr Mahon Hayes on October 19th 2006. The archival and oral history research in this section 
draws on research funded by the Irish Research Council to Prof W.A. Schabas (conducted at Irish Centre for 
Human Rights, NUI Galway) and by University of Sussex to Dr A. O’Sullivan. See A. O’Sullivan and W.A. 
Schabas Ireland v United Kingdom case under the European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge, 
forthcoming). 
72 Judge N Bratza and A Padfield ‘Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ Judicial Review 3(4) (2015) 220-226, 221, citing the Donnelly v United Kingdom, Application Nos 5577-
5583/72, Report of the Commission (1975). 
73 ibid. 
74 See D. Kennedy, ‘International Law and the Nineteenth century: History of an Illusion’, Nordic Journal of 
International Law 65 (1996) 385-420: 392 and Bratza and Padfield, ‘Exhaustion of domestic remedies’, 221 
respectively. 
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After internment was introduced, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs conducted a covert 
investigation that continued periodically from 9th August to late November 1971 and involved 
the collection of countless statements from witnesses through liaising with local NGOs, 
solicitors, local SDLP members and the Sunday Times Insight team.75 At the same time, the 
potential of an inter-state case under the European Convention on Human Rights was 
continually in play within and outside parliament in the months leading to the Irish Cabinet 
decision on 30th November 1971. It is clear from the Ministerial briefs submitted to Cabinet 
that the Cabinet’s decision was influenced by a complex set of dynamics that included 
considerable public pressure throughout the autumn of 1971, the public outrage after 
publication of the Compton Committee’s Report in November 1971, the failure of the Irish 
Government’s diplomacy with their British counterparts over the former’s two key immediate 
objectives, ending internment and abolition of Stormont, and the Attorney General’s legal 
assessment of the voluminous evidence, concluding the high probability of success on article 
3 allegations.76  
 
The Admissibility Stage and ‘Administrative Practice’ 
 
During the preparation of Ireland’s application, Mahon Hayes sought the advice of an 
international lawyer with considerable expertise on the European Convention’s jurisprudence 
– ‘a very reliable source’.77 His contact recommended that the Irish Government should situate 
the article 3 allegations within a wider range of allegations of breaches of the Convention, 
arising from the implementation of internment ‘even though we have good reasons for doubting 
                                                          
75 Interview with Mr Sean Donlon, 8th February 2007. 
76 See W.A. Schabas and A O’Sullivan ‘Of Politics and poor weather: How Ireland sued the UK under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2007) 2 Irish Yearbook of International Law 3-29. See also NAI DT 
2001/5/1. 
77 NAI DFA 2004/7/1936.  Handwritten letter from Mahon Hayes to Declan Quigley, undated. 
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the chances of successfully sustaining these allegations’.78 In support, he considered an 
‘important feature’ of an application to the Commission, much more than before a domestic 
criminal court, is ‘the building up of an atmosphere of irresponsibility and disregard for human 
rights’ and therefore, Hayes recommended that the Irish Government ‘should invoke every case 
which is backed by reasonable evidence…, even if we have good grounds for assuming that 
they will be eliminated on technical (as opposed to merits) grounds’.79 In the end, the Irish 
Government’s application to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1971 raised 
unlawful killings under article 2 and arbitrary interference with private life (searching of 
homes) under article 8 in addition to the allegations under article 3, 5 and 6 (in conjunction 
with article 15 and 14) aforementioned.80 
 
The technical ground that Hayes referred to in his letter to Declan Quigley was the rule on 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. Within the Commission’s earlier jurisprudence, there were 
two ways to overcome the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule in an inter-state case. There 
was the general application of the rule where individual victims, alleging violations of the 
Convention, had been unsuccessful before the domestic courts or other relevant domestic 
mechanisms and therefore, the state party can argue that all legal avenues domestically had 
been exhausted.81 There was also the concept of ‘administrative practice’, which is linked 
theoretically to the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule.82 The underlying principle is that 
‘where there is a practice of non-observance of certain Convention provisions, the remedies 
prescribed will of necessity be side-stepped or rendered inadequate’.83 
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In the Commission’s jurisprudence, an administrative practice has two requirements, a 
‘repetition of [the alleged] acts’ and an ‘official tolerance’. The former involves ‘a substantial 
number of acts…which are the expression of a general situation’, that is, the acts demonstrate 
a pattern of violations. The latter means ‘though the acts…are illegal, they are tolerated in the 
sense that the superiors of those immediately responsible through cognisant of such acts, take 
no action to punish…or prevent their repetition’.84 Alternatively, a higher authority faced with 
numerous allegations ‘manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their 
truth or falsity, or that in judicial proceedings, a fair hearing…is denied’.85 We focus here on 
the strategic use by the Irish Government of the ‘official tolerance’ element within the concept 
of administrative practice. In its submissions, the Irish Government argued the acts alleged 
were ‘of such a character, over such a length of time and in such circumstances’ that it was 
impossible for the acts to have occurred without the knowledge of ‘superiors to those 
immediately responsible’.86 In this respect, they stated to the Commission that they were not 
making allegations ‘personally against any member of the British Government’.87 In reply, the 
British Government denied any authorisation for acts contrary to article 3 and argued that the 
level of tolerance envisaged in the Greek case was ‘a superior of such a rank as to be entitled 
to speak for the Government’, 
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It would…neither be fair nor reasonable to regard condonation by subordinate officers 
of acts forbidden by higher authorities as an administrative practice for which the 
Government is responsible and there was no evidence of such toleration.88 
 
On the five techniques, in particular, the British Government submitted that the Commission 
should distinguish the techniques from other article 3 allegations and decline to proceed further 
as these had been expressly discontinued.89 
 
These competing positions over the concept of ‘official tolerance’ were submitted by both legal 
teams because this concept of administrative practice had never before been applied 
successfully in practice. In the earlier Denmark et al v Greece, the European Commission of 
Human Rights decided that there was insufficient evidence submitted at that point to indicate 
an administrative practice of a violation of article 3.90  Therefore, although the Irish 
Government’s arguments were rooted in the Commission’s jurisprudence, this avenue was to 
some extent unchartered territory and there was no absolute guarantee of successfully 
overcoming the exhaustion of domestic remedies hurdle.91 However, the Irish legal team had 
greater confidence on the article 3 allegations, in particular on the five techniques, because the 
Compton Committee’s Report was considered to be supporting evidence of an administrative 
practice.92  
 
                                                          
88 ibid, 266 (here, they stressed the orders and regulations that prohibited ill-treatment). 
89 Ireland v. United Kingdom, Appl. nos. 5310/71 and 5451/72 (Commission Decision as to Admissibility, 1 
October 1972), 85. 
 90 Ireland v The United Kingdom, Application No, 5310/71 Report of the Commission (25th January 1976), 254, 
citing the Greek Case. 
91 Interview with Mr Mahon Hayes on October 19th 2006. 
92 ibid. 
18 
 
The strategy suggested by Mahon Hayes’ ‘very reliable source’ proved to be prophetic because 
the European Commission of Human Rights in its admissibility decision admitted every 
allegation in the original application except the allegations of unlawful killings under article 2 
(right to life) and of arbitrarily interfering with private life through searching homes under 
article 8 (right to private and family life).93 On article 3, the Commission found that there can 
be no doubt that the employment of ‘five techniques’ constituted an administrative practice. 
However, it left open for consideration on the merits whether the Commission should decline 
to proceed further with its examination (on the merits) in light of their discontinuance.94 
Regarding the other article 3 allegations, the Commission found that, although not admitted, 
the British Government did not submit any counter-evidence or make any detailed comments 
on the evidence submitted by the Irish Government. It also agreed with the Irish Government 
that the article 3 allegations had to be examined as a whole and other forms of alleged ill-
treatment cannot be considered in isolation from the five techniques.95 In this sense, the 
Commission found that the Irish Government sustained its arguments to overcome the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and in turn, most of its application (as an arguable case) 
was admitted for assessment on its merits. 
 
When the Commission rendered it decision, both the Agents of the Irish and British 
Governments were profoundly shocked. Mahon Hayes recalled that he and the British Agent 
Paul Fifoot remained on in Strasbourg at the end of the Admissibility hearings to await the 
decision. The rest of both legal teams had already left.96 When the decision was finally 
delivered, Hayes sat ‘disbelieving’ as he heard how each allegation, except two allegations, 
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had been admitted to the Merits stage. When he turned to look at Paul Fifoot, he ‘was in state 
of shock’.97 The British officials ‘were horrified. They never thought that so much would be 
admitted –they may have thought that some little thing would have got through as a token…But 
obviously [they] were horrified, shock beyond belief’.98 Hayes explained that for the Irish legal 
team, there were greater celebrations at the outcome of the Admissibility decision than at other 
stages of the legal proceedings because the admissibility stage was read as particularly critical. 
It had been assumed that the Irish Government would be successful to a small extent because 
at the very least, the credibility of the Convention ‘would have been affected…if the 
Commission threw out this major inter-state case’.99  
 
The Merits Stage and Article 3 of the Convention 
 
Another strategic use of the Convention language and its institutions was the Irish 
Government’s pursuit of its claim on article 3 and the interrogation methods during the merits 
stage. The central legal argument was that the interrogation methods were a violation of article 
3 of the Convention in terms of the ‘physical, mental and psychological results of such extreme 
“authorised forms of interrogation” [which were] a continuing process with grave sequelae’.100 
The legal outcome sought by the Irish Government was for the Commission to define the rights 
under article 3 and ‘to set more acceptable standards as to what constitutes torture or inhuman 
treatment… than those accepted by the [British] Government’.101 Within this remit, it requested 
the Commission pronounce on the five techniques ‘even though they have now been 
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suspended’ so that the British Government ‘should not be left in any doubt’ as to their 
obligations under the article 3 of the Convention. The Irish Government pursued its claim 
through its interpretation of the Convention jurisprudence, as set out in its Memorial, and 
through its advocacy for witness hearings, including expert witnesses.  
 
The hearings of the Irish Government’s witnesses began in late November 1973 and were held 
again in early 1974.102 The hearings were set against the failure of the friendly settlement 
negotiations facilitated by the European Commission of Human Rights in Paris in mid-
November103 and in the midst of the final preparations for the Sunningdale Conference in early 
December 1973.104 Ultimately, the strategies of the two Governments towards friendly 
settlement were diametrically opposed. The overall aim of British officials was to discuss 
friendly settlement with a view to successfully terminating the Commission proceedings 
‘without a Report and preferably without further witness hearings’.105 They sought to get the 
Irish officials to say what the outstanding issues were and what they sought to achieve from 
the case. In contrast, the overall aim of Irish officials was to delay discussions on friendly 
settlement in order to schedule witness hearings to coincide with the Sunningdale talks. They 
sought British proposals that could then be considered and would not outline what would be 
grounds for a sufficient settlement in the first instance. Both sides maintained their 
diametrically opposed positions during the Paris meeting and the President of the European 
Commission of Human Rights struggled to mediate a common ground. For its part, the 
Commission tried to glean some measure of progress during the meeting, on which to base 
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further discussion. They even tendered certain suggestions, such as introducing broadly based 
legislation to guarantee human rights, an idea described internally by British officials as 
‘unrealistic’.106  
 
The European Commission had earlier decided to approach the Irish Government voluminous 
evidence through ‘illustrative cases’. On the interrogation methods., the Commission heard 
witness testimony from two of the fourteen men subjected to the five techniques as ‘illustrative 
cases’.107 What we focus on is the Irish Government’s expert testimony on the long-term 
psychological effects, which was a significant dimension of the Irish legal team’s evidence. 
They sought to use this expert testimony to refute the British Government’s claim that the 
sensory deprivation techniques did not result in long-term psychological effects and in turn, 
that the issue was moot due to the discontinuance of the five techniques.108 In contrast, the Irish 
Government sought to demonstrate that the five techniques were well-known within psychiatry 
literature, were considered to cause long-term psychological effects and as a consequence, the 
issue was not moot, neither for the individual men involved nor given the possibility of re-
introducing the five techniques through parliamentary approval.109  
 
During the witness hearings, the British counsel poorly cross-examined the Irish expert 
witness, Professor Robert Daly, and the Irish legal team were able to capitalise on ensuing 
discussion, leading to significant evidence being submitted to the European Commission of 
Human Rights. As context, the British counsel Hazan objected to further testimony from 
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Professor Robert Daly, then Professor of Psychiatry in UCC. Hazan argued that Daly’s 
testimony would be repetitive as the five techniques were admitted by the British Government 
and it was unnecessary to explore the issue in expert witness testimony. Rather the question of 
whether the interrogation methods were a practice in breach of article 3 was solely for legal 
argument. The Irish counsel Rory O’Hanlon explained that the aim of the expert testimony was 
to give expert opinion on whether the use of five techniques ‘is calculated to produce 
psychological injury’ and whether they are acceptable methods or ‘harmful’ against whom they 
are used.110 He argued that Daly's evidence was necessary to response to the British 
Government’s position that five techniques, while admitted, 'are not cruel or inhuman or brutal 
treatment'.111 He argued that Daly’s evidence was 'very relevant and very important for the 
delegates to get the expert view...as to whether in their view the use of five techniques is 
capable and likely to produce serious nervous disturbance'.112 Daly then clarified for the Sub-
Commission that his testimony was to make clear that psychiatrists in Britain did know the 
nature of the procedures, that they had published in this regard and that it had been discussed 
previously in Britain that illness resulted from these techniques being applied.113  
 
In reply, Hazan strongly objected to Daly's evidence because it was merely a reference to some 
other author; 'I cannot cross-examine about it since obviously this witness cannot have any 
personal experience of Russian, Chinese and any other techniques'.114 O’Hanlon countered that 
although the British Government had admitted the five techniques, the Compton Committee’s 
Report described each technique as being for a ‘perfectly innocent security purpose’.115 
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Therefore, he argued that ‘it is highly relevant’ to explain how these five techniques were 
already well-known as interrogation processes before ever they were applied in Northern 
Ireland and that there was ‘no reality in the suggestion that they were not used for the purposes 
of breaking down the morale and resistance of the persons concerned’.116 O’Hanlon rejected 
the idea that the methods such as hooding was used simply to prevent a prisoner from looking 
around or constant noise to prevent the men chatting to each other. Hazan continued to 
emphasise that Daly could not possibly know about the practice of these interrogation methods 
as it is only something he reads in some other book’ and in any case, he rejected the theory that 
the existence of some book meant the United Kingdom ‘are put on notice and we know all 
about it'.117 
 
The delegates adjourned and decided they would hear the psychiatric evidence on the effects 
of the five techniques, including on the question of long-term after-effects.118 O'Hanlon then 
brought Daly through his view of the psychological stress caused by each technique and then, 
the effects of the techniques applied in combination.119 When Hazan turned to cross-examine 
Daly, he was not aware that Daly had previously been a psychiatrist in the British Army 
because Daly had been instructed by Irish counsel not to disclose this before the 
Commission.120 Hazan focused on Daly’s lack of attendance at and personal knowledge of 
interrogations and how Daly’s understanding was only drawn from academic studies.121 Hazan 
then pointed out that there was no direct literature on the five techniques but Daly said he was 
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aware of the techniques in the literature before they were applied in Northern Ireland.122 
However, Hazan continued to pursue the point, arguing that there was ‘no book’ to Daly’s 
knowledge written about the five techniques rather there was literature about variations of these 
kinds of methods that had been used historically.123 Daly replied that he was unsure if he could 
answer Hazan’s question. He did not know if the British Official Secrets Acts applied to what 
he said before the Commission. Professor Opshal from the Commission explained that anything 
said in the confidential hearings was immune from legal proceedings.124 Daly then proceeded 
to explain how he was aware that the five techniques had been written down and that British 
Military Psychiatrists had accessed to this literature,   
 
In that sense, I feel free to say that I was present at a discussion and a conference in 
1969 in which the specific techniques were discussed, and I was given literature about 
them. It was a secret conference.125  
 
Hazan responded with a series of questions designed to understand fully what conference 
Professor Daly had attended. It was the 1969 US/UK Military Psychiatry Conference, a secret 
military conference between the British and American military psychiatrists that was held 
every two years. At the conference, professional psychiatric papers were read and discussed.126 
Daly explained that while the particular paper was discussed and copies were provided in 
advance, it ‘was headed in such a way that it indicated it was not allowed to be discussed 
outside’.127 When Hazan asked if Daly remembered the particular paper’s title, the latter was 
reluctant to reveal the information for fear of getting the author ‘into trouble’.128 Hazan replied 
that the information was necessary given the issue had now arisen and Prof Opsahl interjected 
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to remind Daly that his answers before the Commission were not the same as publishing 
anything.129 In reply, Daly revealed that the psychiatrist was Lieutenant-Colonel Stevenson and 
that he (Daly) could probably locate the particular paper for the afternoon’s session.130 Later in 
the afternoon, before the testimony of the other Irish expert witness Professor Baastians, 
O'Hanlon informed the Commission that Professor Daly had located the paper ‘which is a paper 
entitled “Medical aspects of Interrogation” delivered by Lt Col Stephens’.131 He had already 
given a copy of the paper to Mr Hazan ‘and we feel it would be of help to the delegates to have 
this paper made available to them and we are willing to do this'.132 
 
This segment of the Commission’s witness transcript reveals that the Irish legal team had to 
first succeed in getting this expert testimony heard in face of strong objections from British 
counsel. Once the Commission delegates had agreed to hear Professor Daly’s testimony on the 
psychiatric effects of the techniques, the examination and cross-examination allowed Professor 
Daly to explore the extent of what was known about the specific ‘five techniques’ within both 
the literature and internally, within the British Armed forces. Due to Hazan’s cross-
examination, the Irish legal team were able to submit into evidence before the Commission a 
psychiatric paper specifically on the ‘five techniques’ that had been confidentially circulated 
among British Military psychiatrists, who attended the 1969 conference. It also reveals that the 
Commission delegates were aware that the conflicting expert evidence on the long-term 
psychological effects of the five techniques was in fact between former (Daly) and current 
(Leigh) British Military psychiatrists. By using expert testimony, the Irish legal team succeeded 
in raising the question of long-term psychological techniques before the Sub-Commission 
delegates. In their 1976 Report, the Commission found that, despite the conflicting evidence, 
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it was satisfied long-term effects could not be excluded and it did not preclude a finding of 
practice of torture given the systematic nature of the combined techniques.133 In this sense, the 
Commission privileged the counter-narrative of the Irish Government’s expert testimony as 
against the British Government’s expert testimony because they accepted the ‘systematic 
nature’ of the combined techniques. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
The Irish legal team, through the use of the concept of administrative practice, succeeded in 
securing for the merits hearing an examination of British Government’s policy of internment 
and its use of discontinued interrogation methods. This outcome was not considered an 
inevitability by the Irish legal team, who believed that their allegations, other than article 3 
allegations, were much more unlikely to be admitted. Rather the Irish legal team had greater 
confidence in overcoming the admissibility hurdle on its article 3 allegations. Their strategy of 
submitting a wide-ranging inter-state petition resulted in the Irish Government’s political 
assessment of both internment and the interrogation methods being examined at the merits 
stage, including through the use of witness testimony. The Irish legal team’s interpretation of 
‘official tolerance’ in the context of Northern Ireland in 1971 meant that it focused on 
‘superiors to those immediately responsible’ and could avoid alleging Ministerial 
authorization.  
 
Within the merits stage examination, the witness hearings of psychiatric expert opinion on the 
interrogation methods was also not an inevitability but rather the outcome of an intensely 
contested dispute between the Irish and British counsels before the Commission’s Sub-
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Commission delegates. As we noted, significant evidence of British military psychiatrists’ 
awareness of the five techniques as sensory deprivation techniques was entered into evidence 
before the Commission due to the British counsel’s cross-examination. The latter evidence 
demonstrated to the Commission that the dispute among psychiatrists, referred to in its 1976 
Report, was between former and current British Military psychiatrists. In this way, the 
Convention institutions permitted the Irish Government to deploy the Convention’s language 
strategically and secure certain of its arguments in accordance with the institutions’ bias. 
Nevertheless, as was noted in the original proceedings, the British Government’s co-operation 
was described by the Commission as at times less than desired. This meant that key evidence 
on the authorization of and psychiatric effects of the use of the five techniques, as revealed in 
the recent McKenna v McGuigan and the Ireland v United Kingdom cases, was not submitted 
before the Commission. Therefore, the Irish Government’s strategic deployment of rights 
language, in order to secure its particular account, operated within an institutional framework 
that relies on state party disclosure.  
